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Multilateral Treaties and the Formation
of Customary International Law*
GARY L. SCOTT**
CRAIG L. CARR***
International law is based upon two apparently contradictory
assumptions: first, that the states, being sovereign, are basically
not subject to any legal restraint; second, that international law
does pose such restraints.
Joseph Frankel'
There is an understandable temptation to assume that interna-
tional law must match the model of a legal system associated with
domestic law. There is also, however, a crucial distinction between the
two that indicates it might be wise to avoid the temptation. Interna-
tional law, it is commonly supposed, imposes obligations upon states
and by so doing constrains the range of proper state behavior. But
states also make international law; they author the obligations to
which they are bound. They are both sovereign and subject at the
same time, a condition quite foreign to domestic legal systems.2
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the International Studies
Association 37th Annual Convention, San Diego, California on April 18, 1996. The
authors wish to express their thanks to Peter H. Rohn for his comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
** Department Head, Political Science at Portland State University; Ph.D. in
Political Science, University of Washington; M.A. University of Washington.
*** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Ph.D., University of
Washington.
1. JOSEPH FRANKEL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 23 (4th
ed. 1988).
2. This point may seem controversial since, after all, people make laws even in
domestic legal systems. But legislators are not ordinarily considered to be both sov-
ereign and subject at the same time. Strictly speaking, it seems impossible for a
sovereign to be subject to the law. A sovereign who wanted to disobey some law he
had made could simply declare a new law for the moment or make a legal exception
in this instance. Legislators, as citizens, are subject to the laws of democratic societ-
ies like everyone else; thus they lack sovereign authority in themselves.
It might also be suggested that states are bound to obey the requirement of
their own legal systems. In the United States, for example. the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land and it places constraints upon state action. In this sense,
we may speak of sovereign authority as limited. But there are some notorious prob-
lems with this way of speaking. Public officials tend to have their own views about
the nature of constitutional limits that apply to them and even about when they
apply to them. If we think of these limits as self-imposed, the attempt to square the
judicial circle by holding that constitutional governments are both sovereign and
subject at the same time begins to decay.
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This curious feature of international law raises a host of problems
in need of clarification and discussion. For example, how do states
create international law in the first place? If a state opts to disobey
international law, is it acting illegally or is it creating new law? And
how can a state come to stand under an obligation to obey internation-
al law anyway? We do not intend to attempt a frontal assault on these
questions here. Instead, we will concern ourselves with an examination
of one particular context in which they arise.
According to one rather popular view, treaties are a source of
international customary law.' This view has become particularly popu-
lar in recent years because of pressing global problems requiring glob-
ally cooperative solutions. Cooperative solutions are most easily and
quickly effected by the treaty process, but treaties, as such, obligate
only those states that are parties to them and participation in these
treaties is often not widespread enough to be effective. The solution,
then, is to envision these treaties as creating customary international
law, which, it is believed, obligates all states. Popular though this view
may be, it is hardly accepted by all, and so there is reason to examine
what there is to be said for it. We shall argue that those parts of mul-
tilateral treaties which are generalizable beyond the particulars of the
treaty can serve as a source of customary international law provided
three basic conditions are met:
1) The treaty is accepted by a sufficient number of states in the inter-
national system.
2) Among the parties to the treaty there are a significant number of
those states whose interests are most affected by the treaty.
3) The treaty provisions are not subject to reservations by the accept-
ing parties.
I. CUSTOM, OBLIGATION, AND CONSENT
Law obligates, at least in the traditional view. It is generally
agreed that international law obligates as well. This is the source of
some confusion. If states are sovereign, and hence answerable to no
higher authority, how do such obligations come into being? The ques-
tion has a more exact nature with regard to multilateral treaties: How
could a treaty between states B, C, D .... N, obligate state A to abide
by the substance of the treaty? If international law does obligate, it
must be possible to make sense of this. Therefore, we will consider this
problem, as a matter in need of preliminary clarification, before explor-
ing how multilateral treaties might create customary international
3. See e.g., R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INTVL L. 275 (1965-66); ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT




One classic way to formulate the problem of the imperative nature
of customary international law calls attention to the apparent hyposta-
sis at work here. States are not persons, so what sense does it make to
treat them as such and ascribe actions and obligations to them? This
characterization is a rather commonplace feature of legal systems in
general, of course, and not just of international law.4 But noting this
does little to solve the problem, since one can wonder about the pro-
priety of all such characterizations. Obligations, like actions, are prop-
erly predictable of persons and not of things like states or corporations.
This difficulty dissolves, however, if we speak of state obligations as a
shorthand for the obligations that adhere to their official representa-
tives. Such obligations are not owed by these representatives as indi-
viduals, of course, but rather as a consequence of the position they
have assumed. They are, in effect, a type of positional duty - an obli-
gation that rides with the position of authority one occupies.' Talk of
the obligation of states thus becomes a metaphorical way of speaking
about the obligations owed by the officers and official spokespersons of
the state.
However, this is not the problem of state obligation that we wish
to address. Instead, we want to question how states come to stand
under an obligation to obey customary international law in the first
place. There is a parallel with the classic problem of political obligation
familiar to students of political philosophy. As subjects of a given legal
jurisdiction, persons are presumed-particularly by legal authori-
ties-to have an obligation to obey the law. The obligation, moreover,
holds because the law is law and not because of any moral merit that
a particular law might have. But people cannot be naturally subject to
civil law since the state is an artificial construct rather than a natural
set of human relationships.6 Then, how do people, qua citizens, come
to have such obligations?
Certain conceptual points make this question, and the cognate
question of how legal obligations adhere to states, more troublesome.
Moral philosophers frequently note that obligations, unlike duties,
must be voluntarily assumed.7 A person who stands under an obliga-
4. For example, the law has for some time treated corporations as fictional
persons, and there is no reason why states cannot be similarly treated.
5. A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 16-24
(1979).
6. This is, at any rate, the classic liberal view. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIA-
THAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIATICAL AND
CIVIL (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier-MacMillan Ltd 1962); HuGo GROTiUS, DE JURE
PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIzE AND BOOTY (James
Brown Scott ed. & Gwladys I. Williams trans., The Clarendon Press 1950) (1604);
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Thomas P. Perdon ed., The
Liberal Arts Press 1952 (1764).
7. See Richard Brandt, The Concepts of Obligation and Duty, 73 MIND (1965);
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tion must first have done something to incur it. If so, then obligations
cannot be imposed from without; they come into being only with the
voluntary consent of the obligee. Viewed historically, this reliance upon
consent emerges with the rise of modem liberalism and the concurrent
secularization of western political thought.
Pufendorf, who helped develop the early impetus of these trends
in western political discourse, supposed that an obligation throws a
"moral bridle" over the will.8 This aptly characterizes the sense in
which an obligation is a type of moral constraint that precludes choice
and determines conduct. But he also held that obligations can have
two separate sources.9 First, they can be assumed, through consent, by
individuals who place the bridle upon themselves. Second, obligations
can be imposed on one by a superior authority. Thus God imposes His
law on human beings, and that law obligates, according to Pufendorf,
simply because of His moral authority. The substance of this distinc-
tion remains current in moral and political theory, although reference
to God is frequently replaced, in the post-Kantian world, by a reliance
upon Reason as the authoritative voice. Additionally, the distinction
now takes a significantly different form, and one that emphasizes the
voluntary dimension of obligations. It is now customary to understand
the "moral bridle" imposed upon the will by Reason or God as a natu-
ral or moral duty, while a self-imposed bridle, i.e., one to which a per-
son consents, is understood to be an obligation.'0
We are not concerned with whether states stand under a duty to
obey international law, or whether international law is built upon or
reflects certain fundamental elements of natural law. It does not ap-
pear, however, that multilateral treaties can give rise to natural duties
in this sense. Suppose there is a natural duty binding upon states to
do X (perhaps a principle of jus cogens), and suppose further that a
preponderant majority of the states of the world ratify a multilateral
treaty stipulating the need to do X. The treaty provides an additional
normative reason why the states that ratify it ought to do X; they have
both a natural duty and an obligation to do so. States that have chosen
not to participate in the treaty, on the other hand, are still duty
bound, from the standpoint of natural law, to do X. But it is less clear
that the presence of the treaty means that they also have an obligation
to do X brought into force by the treaty. The treaty cannot create the
natural duty; nor for that matter is there any reason for it to do so.
John Ladd, Legal and Moral Obligation, NOMOS XII: POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGA-
TION 3 (1970).
8. Samuel Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence,in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 50 (Craig L. Carr ed. & Michael J. Seidler trans.
1994).
9. Id. at 167. In this, as in other things, Pufendorf followed Grotius. See
GROTIUS, supra note 6, at 15.
10. SIMMONS, supra note 5, at 11-16.
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The duty exists and holds against all states independently of the trea-
ty. So, appeals to natural duty fail to shed any light on whether multi-
lateral treaties can create obligatory customary international law.
Since treaties are voluntary agreements, it is not hard to under-
stand why they obligate their signatories.1 By signing a treaty, a
state consents to obey its provisions. 2 Moreover the fact that a state
has consented solely determines the state's obligation. Suppose the
substance of a treaty requires the signatories to do X, and suppose fur-
ther that doing X is generally regarded in the international community
as a good idea. The fact that X is a good idea provides a reason why
states ought to do X, but it does not also establish that states which
have not signed the treaty are obligated to do X. The existence of an
obligation to do X supplies a strong reason of its own why a state
ought to do X independently of the fact that it is a good idea."3 In the
absence of a showing of consent, however, even good ideas do not
obligate.
The consent requirement raises an obvious barrier to the idea that
multilateral treaties create customary international law and thereby
obligate non-signatories to abide by their terms. Consider, for example,
a hypothetical situation, of the sort imagined by Baxter, where all
states in the state-system, minus one, sign a multilateral treaty re-
quiring that they do X." Baxter supposes that X would also constitute
a rule of customary international law, presumably by virtue of its
general acceptance, that would obligate the one state that failed to
sign the treaty. This reveals something of the logic of customary inter-
national law, to be sure, but it also complicates the problem of obliga-
tion. Absent a foundational principle of majority rule, as a type of
"secondary rule," it is simply not clear why the remaining single state
should be said to stand under an obligation to adhere to X.V ' Such
general acceptance might show that most states in the system think
adherence to X is a good idea and correspondingly that all states ought
to adhere to it. But something more must be added if we want to insist
that states have an obligation to adhere to X, and this something more
11. Corbett notes, "Treaties considered as agreements are acts of consent; consid-
ered as documents they are records of evidence of consent." P. Corbett, The Consent
of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L 22, 25 (1925).
Peace treaties are arguably an exception to this.
12. I.M. Lobo Souza, The Role of Consent in the Customary Process, 44 INTL &
COMP. L.Q. 521 (1995). Rex J. Zedalis, Protection of Nationals Abroad: Is Consent the
Basis of Legal Obligations?, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 209 (1990).
13. The fact that X is an obligation also qualifies as a reason for action, and
perhaps the controlling reason at that. See J. RAZ, THE AuTHORITY OF LAw 234
(1979).
14. R. BAXTER, TREATIES AND CUSTOM 38 (1970). But see, C. Tomuschat, Obliga-
tions Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195,
at 268-73 (1993 V).
15. H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (2d ed. 1994).
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must satisfy the consent requirement necessary to establish an obliga-
tion.
We want to suggest, but to suggest only, how the consent condi-
tion can be met, and thus to point toward a theory of obligation capa-
ble of accounting for the obligatory character of customary internation-
al law. Consent is something that is given; in this sense, all consent is
expressed.16 But consent can be expressed in a variety of ways, per-
haps the most familiar of which is the type of formal expression of
consent associated with the law of contracts. The law has long recog-
nized, however, that consent can be expressed tacitly as well." Both
Grotius and Pufendorf relied heavily on the notion of tacit consent to
explain how certain conventional relationships came into being and
why they continue to obligate those who participate in them. 8
Pufendorf, for example, supposed that tacit consent is "clearly inferred
from the nature of the affair and other circumstances." 9 He used as
an example the attractive instance of a person ordering a meal at a
restaurant. By ordering the meal the person tacitly consents to pay for
it. This is an act of participation or involvement in a social practice
that carries with it a tacit expression of consent to the rules and proce-
dures of the practice itself.20 To participate in the practice simply is to
consent to obey the rules of the practice. Therefore, one who makes
obvious moves of participation in some practice thereby incurs an obli-
gation to obey its rules.
Thus understood, tacit consent can be used to explain how indi::d-
uals who come together and participate in rule-governed associative
practices incur obligations to adhere to the rules. Imagine several
youths join forces and invent a game. The rules of play will be under-
stood as obligatory for all participants, although the youths can alter
the rules during the course of play as they see fit. Here, participation
signals consent to follow the rules even if some of the youths dislike
some of the rules adopted by the group as a whole. There is an obvious
analogy here with relations between states. As participants in the
inter-state system, states can be understood to tacitly signal their
consent to obey those rules considered by the elements of the system to
be of great importance. If the status of international law is invoked to
indicate the importance many states attach to certain rules, identified
as rules of the inter-state system, then participation in the inter-state
system provides adequate grounds for concluding that states incur an
16. J. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM, AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 4 (1968).
17. Cf. FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, K. KESSLER AND G. GILMORE,
CONTRACTS 116-17 (2d. ed. 1970); P. AT1YAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 34 (1981).
18. GROTIUS, supra note 6, at 19; PUFENDORF, supra note 8, at 171.
19. Pufendorf, supra note 8, at 171.
20. The sense of tacit consent introduced here has been developed more fully by
Craig Carr. See Craig Carr, Tacit Consent, 4 PUB. AFF. Q. (1990).
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obligation to adhere to these rules.
Some may object that the element of voluntarism which many
philosophers think is associated with displays of consent is lacking in
the case of states.2 If one of the youngsters involved in developing a
particular game does not care for some of the rules, she can decide not
to participate, and if she opts not to participate, she has no obligation
to obey the rules of play. Since it looks as if states cannot decide not to
participate in the inter-state system, it might seem wrong to conclude
that their participation entails consent to obey the rules of customary
international law. But this objection does not seem to get very far. A
state can always declare its intention not to participate in the ordinary
relations of states. It can even welcome a general identification as a
rogue or lawless state, thereby demonstrating its unwillingness to
participate in the ordinary relations of states. But states rarely do this.
Instead, they often invoke international law on their own behalf, make
law-like arguments in defense of their actions, and proceed to conduct.
their international affairs according to the standard practices of the
international system. When a state behaves this way and eschews be-
havior patterns that would indicate it wants to be recognized as a
rogue state, it is fair to say that it is participating in the inter-state
system and thus incurs an obligation to abide by those rules consid-
ered important enough to be regarded as binding law by the states of
the system.2
There is a second, and rather familiar objection to this argument.
It suffers the standard problem of imprecision that troubles the subject
of international law in general. How many states must regard a rule
as important before it can properly be recognized as a general rule of
international law? How important must a norm be before it qualifies
as a rule of international law? However, these are not questions about
whether international law obligates, but about what counts as interna-
tional law. We have offered some reasons to think that if X qualifies as
a rule of customary international law, states have an obligation to obey
it. This returns us to the more traditional problem of how X might
come to qualify as a rule of customary international law. More specifi-
cally, it returns us to the question, posed at the outset, whether multi-
lateral treaties give rise to customary international law. If it turns out
that such treaties do generate customary international law, we now
have reason to conclude that even states that are not parties to the
treaty stand under an obligation to adhere to the terms of the treaty.
21. SIMMONS, supra note 5, at 93-100.
22. One possible exception to this might be found in notions about persistent
objectors. For an excellent discussion of the various viewpoints regarding the per-
sistent objector rule, see Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the
Development of Customary International Law, 56 BRrT. Y.B. INTL L. 1 (1985).
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II. TREATIES AND THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Two issues orbit the question of whether treaties make customary
international law. The first issue is whether treaties "create" custom-
ary international law or are merely to be taken as a piece of evidence,
perhaps of state practice and/or opinio juris, that is no more compel-
ling than any other piece of evidence regarding the establishment of
customary international law.23 If we suppose that treaties do some-
times make customary international law, the second issue is whether
such treaties create "instant custom" or whether their conditions must
"harden" or "ripen into" customary international law.24
We will argue that treaties do present evidence of customary in-
ternational law and that this evidence can be, in some instances, more
important than other pieces of evidence. Depending upon the issue, a
treaty may be the most important, indeed may be the only, evidence of
customary international law, or it may present only minor evidence
compared with other state practices and opinio juris. We will argue
also that one cannot decide in the abstract if or when treaty provisions
become part of customary international law. Rather, there must be
some test or index by which each treaty and its provisions can be
judged in making this determination. Applying this test to some trea-
ties may indeed show that they become instant custom upon entry into
force, applying it to others may show that they need to "ripen" beyond
their force date before they can be said to create customary interna-
tional law.
Since his very influential work on customary international law,
Anthony D'Amato has become the champion of the school of thought
that argues that treaties should be thought of as creating customary
international law.25 As D'Amato himself states regarding his 1971
book, "I leaped to the radical position that treaties directly generate
customary rules."6 D'Amato has many critics, however, who claim
that the role of treaties in the formulation of international law has
been greatly overstated by D'Amato and his followers.17 This conten-
tious issue crystallized in a debate between Arthur M. Weisburd and
D'Amato first published in 1988 and D'Amato has reaffirmed his posi-
tion in his more recent work.28 But, the debate over this question is
not new; it has received attention since the beginnings of challenges to
23. See generally A.M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of
Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1 (1988).
24. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 139.
25. See generally id.
26. Anthony D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 459, 461 (1988).
27. See Weisburd, supra note 23. Michael Akehurst, Custom As a Source of In-
ternational Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 1 (1974-75).




The debate concerns both bilateral and multilateral treaties, but
we will concern ourselves here only with a subset of multilateral trea-
ties, or as they have been referred to in the past, the so-called "law-
making treaties."0 While we agree with D'Amato that bilateral trea-
ties also can create customary international law, this point seems more
straightforward and seems mostly to be based on magnitudes or quan-
tities. That is, if there are few bilateral treaties covering a particular
subject, these treaties do not provide strong evidence of the formation
of customary law. Conversely, if there are large numbers of treaties on
a subject and these treaties treat the subject in the same way, they do
provide strong evidence of both state practice and opinio juris.
3 1
It is held by certain authors that global treaties (i.e., those that
are open for participation by all states) with general provisions create
law that is binding on all states in the international system, irrespec-
tive of whether they are parties to the treaty. Just how these treaties
create obligations for third parties has been a matter of considerable
discussion among international law scholars. 2
One of the ways suggested is that these treaties create "instant
customary international law" and since all states are obligated to obey
customary international law, states are, ipso facto, obligated by the
customary law created by the law-making treaty. Or as D'Amato has
put it,
The claim made here is not that treaties bind nonparties, but that
general provisions in treaties give rise to rules of customary law
binding upon all states. The custom is binding, not the treaty.3
(emphasis added)
This is one way, of course, to avoid confrontation with the well
known principle of customary international law, pacta tertiis nec
nocent nec prosunt. This principle, formally restated in articles 34
through 37 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, has long
been understood by states, international courts, and scholars alike as a
29. See generally D'AMATO, supra note 3.
30. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 161. In one sense this term is a redundancy be-
cause all treaties create law for their parties. D'Amato has noted that this term has
fallen into disuse in recent years, however, we think it useful to convey the meaning
that we are referring only to those treaties that seem to have as their purpose the
creation or codification of international law. Id.
31. D'Amato points out that by sheer numbers alone bilateral treaties must be
taken as evidence of customary international law. He states, "yet, as I argued in my
book on custom in 1971, if we look at the matter mathematically, a multilateral
convention among ten states is the equivalent of forty-five similarly worded bilateral
treaties among the same ten states." D'Amato supra, note 28, at 99.
32. D'Amato, supra note 28.
33. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 107.
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customary principle of treaty law. 4 The Convention, however, may
have added to the confusion surrounding the application of treaty
provisions to third parties. Article 38 of the Convention concerning
"Rules in a Treaty Becoming Binding on Third States Through Inter-
national Custom" states, "Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule
set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a
customary rule of international law, recognized as such.""3 (emphasis
added)
Whether article 38 states that customary international law, al-
ready established, is what binds states, remains unclear. The Conven-
tion itself does so by restating such customary international law prin-
ciples as pacta tertiis (Articles 34-37) and pacta sunt servanda (Article
26), or whether the treaties in question can create customary interna-
tional law by the means of "instant custom.""6 The words, "recognized
as such" seem to give weight to the notion that the treaties themselves
cannot create law binding on third states, but can only articulate al-
ready recognized principles of customary international law. But the
first part of the sentence, "Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule
set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a
customary rule of international law... " (emphasis added) suggests
another possibility. Treaties can "suggest" new customary intern-
ational law or articulate nascent customary international law, but in
either case recognition by a substantial number of states in the inter-
national system is required before it can be converted into customary
international law obligating all states.37
Since World War II there have been increasing numbers of global
multilateral treaties in the international system. Most of them have
come into force; the remainder remain "unperfected."5 One of the
main issues surrounding these treaties involves clarifying the point at
which they create customary international law. That is, do they create
customary international law - and thus obligations - for third states
when the treaty comes into force, or do they require some broader
acceptance among states, and particularly "pertinent" states, before
the customary law obligation emerges?
To argue, following D'Amato, that these treaties create customary
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.39/27,May
23, 1969 as reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969).
35. Id. at 887.
36. "The Convention is not simply declaratory of general international law, since
in part it involves the progressive development of the law. However, particular arti-
cles reflect the existing rules or practice." BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
389 (Ian Brownlie ed., 4th ed. 1995).
37. But see Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International
Law, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1110, 1139-40 (1982).
38. See generally CHRISTIAN L. WIKTOR, UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1976, vol. I-IX (1976).
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international law when they come into force 9 is also to argue that a
small percentage of the world's states should be able to create law for
the entire system. In other words this argument is not even an argu-
ment in favor of majority rule in the international system, a concept
itself not thoroughly or perhaps even widely accepted, ° because often
a minority of states can bring a treaty into force. Moreover, in many
instances this minority of states, as we shall demonstrate below, may
not even include those states that are most concerned with the par-
ticular obligations being created, e.g. major maritime powers and law
of the sea provisions.
In spite of the fact that D'Amato at times argues that multilateral
treaties create customary international law upon ratification, he also
says,
To the extent that a widely adopted multilateral convention repre-
sents the consensus of states on the precepts contained therein
those precepts are part of international law by that fact alone. In
this sense, multilateral treaties are and historically have been more
important than bilateral ones. But this effect is not due to anything
connected with the concept of custom; it involves a separate phe-
nomenon - 'consensus' - which deserves separate study as to its
nature, identification, and provability."
We think, however, that the determination of consensus among the
states of the world has much to do with the formation of customary
law from treaty provisions and we will deal with that issue here.
Some authors argue that the most important thing in determining
whether a treaty can become part of customary international law is
the intent of the parties to the treaty. They argue that the intent of
the treaty can be ascertained from the language of the treaty itself or
from an examination of the travaux preparatoires.2 D'Amato correctly
argues against the use of either the intent as manifested in the text of
the treaty or in the travaux preparatoires,5 partly because in both of
these the true intent of the parties may not be shown accurately. More
importantly, he argues that it is not the intent of the parties to the
treaty that matters, but rather what the rest of the community of
states makes of the contents of the treaty. Accordingly he argues, "In-
ternational law proceeds on the basis of community expectations, not
39. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 164. "If treaties do at any point in time pass into
customary law, they pass at the moment they are ratified. The passage of a period
of time simply makes the treaty as a secondary rule more persuasive." Id.
40. STEVEN SCHWEBEL, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS,
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EFFECT OF UN
RESOLUTIONS ON EMERGING LEGAL NORMS 301 (1979).
41. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 165.
42. Id. at 156-60.
43. Id. at 154-57.
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the 'will' of particular members of the community."4' On this basis,
can we not say that multilateral treaties themselves cannot generally
create "instant" customary international law for all of the states in the
international system, but rather must await their subsequent reac-
tions.
D'Amato objects to theories suggesting that treaty provisions must
"harden into" customary law before they can obligate all states.' But,
while he would likely not appreciate our drawing such an inference
from his statement quoted above, the only way that we can be sure
that the will of the community of states manifests, concerning provi-
sions in treaties that are meant to be suggestive or creative of custom-
ary international law, is indeed to await the necessary state accep-
tance for them to "harden into" customary international law.'
Perhaps one exception to this would be a treaty declaring law on a
subject that had not yet been dealt with in international law. Exam-
ples of this phenomenon might be found in some of the provisions
contained in treaties dealing with outer space."7 Perhaps when ex-
isting customary international law is silent on a matter the treaty
would constitute the only existing evidence of state practice and opinio
juris on that particular subject. Absent any negative response on the
part of states, the treaty might be said to be creative of customary
international law in the sense that it represents the only existing evi-
dence of law dealing with the issue. At the very least, we might expect
that should a dispute arise over the subject matter relevant to the
"new law" and if that dispute is to be decided by third party arbitra-
tion or adjudication, then, the dispute settler would probably use the
relevant treaty provisions as evidence of customary international law
on the subject. Moreover, this might hold even if neither of the dispu-
tant states were party to the treaty. Certainly the World Court has
availed itself of this method in past cases where customary practice
and opinio juris were in doubt. 8
As we have noted above, D'Amato objects to the idea that treaties
need to "harden into" customary international law. His main problem
with this concept lies in its imprecision. That is, if we subscribe to this
44. Id. at 151.
45. Id. at 139 & n.109.
46. Id. at 139-40.
47. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410; 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389; 961 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter Space Object Convention].
48. For a summary of cases, see D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 116-21. He notes,
among others, the following cases as evidence of the court's reliance on treaties as
customary international law: The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, Asylum
Case, 1950 I.C.J. 266, Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116.
VOL. 25:1
MULTILATERAL TREATIES
notion, then we do not have a definitive way of knowing just when and
how the conventional law becomes customary international law.49 In-
sofar as the passage of an indefinite period of time is concerned, we see
no particular reason to disagree with D'Amato. Time passage alone, no
matter how long, will not make conventional law metamorphose into
customary international law. Beyond that, however, two responses may
be made to D'Amato's objections to the imprecision created by the
notion that treaties need something more than ratification and entry
into force to evolve or "harden" into customary international law.
The first response is that customary international law is not a
precise entity in the first place.5" Ample evidence of this is to be found
in the numerous writings of scholars on the subject and in the lengths
to which courts go in trying to discover what customary international
law is on any particular subject at any particular time. So trying to
make precise that which has never been precise may be chasing an
illusion. Even D'Amato, who says that treaties create customary inter-
national law upon their ratification,51 notes that the law developed by
treaties does not remain static, but is affected by state practice that
can modify or even eliminate the law originally stated in the treaty. 2
If this is so, then the entry-into-force of a treaty, at best, has given us
only momentary precision about the law.
The second possible response to the problem of imprecision is to
try to add precision by specifying a more reasonable index for gauging
if and when conventional law has become part of customary interna-
tional law. In other words, when.a treaty has come into force with only
the ratifications of a small percentage of the world's states, is there
another benchmark, beyond the point of ratification suggested by
D'Amato, with which we might be more comfortable in asserting that
the treaty provisions have become accepted as customary international
law? While another index may not have the same definitive time line
enjoyed by entry-into-force, it might be more realistic in claiming with
some certainty that the law stated in the treaty has been accepted by
the community of states. If international law does indeed proceed "on
the basis of community expectations," and not on the will of a minority
of states, there then needs to be a way to determine more accurately
and realistically whether the community of states has accepted the
nascent law put forward in the treaty as having become part of the
corpus of customary international law. If such a method can be created
and achieves some acceptance, then availing oneself of that method
49. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 140.
50. As Michael Akehurst notes, "The attitude of international lawyers towards
customary international law is somewhat similar; they invoke rules of customary
international law every day, but they have great difficulty in agreeing on a defini-
tion of customary international law." Akehurst, supra note 27, at 1.
51. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 164.
52. Id. at 142.
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should lend strong evidence, pro or con, to the issue of whether one can
consider certain treaties, or provisions thereof, to be customary inter-
national law.
Such an index has already been suggested by the ICJ in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases.5" We believe this index can be stated
more specifically and can be applied in a systematic way in order to
get us closer to the determination of when customary law is generated
by treaty provisions. The Court's ruling in this case suggests three
criteria to be used in the determination of whether treaty provisions
could become part of customary international law. These three criteria
are: 1) the number of states in the international system that have
formally accepted the treaty by whatever means specified in the treaty
for formal acceptance, e.g., ratification;5 4 2) the presence or absence of
"pertinent" states among the parties to the treaty;55 and 3) the exis-
tence of reservations to any provisions by the parties. 6 We will deal
with each of these in turn and provide examples of their application
below.
A. Parties to the Treaty-Sufficient Numbers
It is generally believed that widespread acceptance of a legal prin-
ciple is necessary for it to be understood as part of customary interna-
tional law. Though D'Amato believes that the Court's mention of insuf-
ficient adoption in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases57 "also suf-
fers from imprecision,"58 there is no particular reason that this some-
what-less-than-precise magnitudinal statement cannot be made more
precise by setting specific quantifiable standards.
The relevance of magnitude has long been established in interna-
tional law and, as Peter Rohn has pointed out, "Quantitative notions
permeate all law."" The ICJ itself has found numerous instances
where reference to magnitude or to quantity was found to be of rele-
vance to the judicial decision.6" There have been several cases in
which the Court found particular need to cite quantities in order to
53. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3
Feb. 20).
54. Id. at 43.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 44.
57. Id.
58. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 112 n.12.
59. 1 PETER H. ROHN, WORLD TREATY INDEX 16 (2d ed. 1984).
60. Id. at 18. The cases listed by Rohn in which magnitude or quantity played a
role in the Court's decision were: Corfu Channel Case, (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4;
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266; Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.A.) 1952 I.C.J. 176; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.) 1962 I.C.J. 6;
South West Africa (Eth v. S.Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr) 1966 I.C.J. 6; North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3.
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determine if a rule in a treaty had achived widespead enough accep-
tance to become a part of customary international law. In the Asylum
Case, Columbia " . . . invoked conventions which have not been ratified
by Peru."6 ' The Court was called upon to determine if the convention-
al law contained in certain treaties had attained the status of regional
customary international law for the Americas and would thus be valid
against Peru. Referring to the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and
193962 the Court noted, "The Convention of 1933 has, in fact, been
ratified by not more than 11 States and the Convention of 1939 by two
States only."' The Court concluded that because of the limited num-
ber of states ratifying these agreements they were not applicable to
Peru as customary international law."
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases," the Court was con-
cerned with the question of whether Article 6 of the Geneva Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea," had passed into customary international
law. On the general question of whether a treaty provision could pass
into customary international law and thus become binding upon third
states, the Court stated:
There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and
does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recog-
nized methods by which new rules of customary international law
may be formed. At the same time this result is not lightly to be
regarded as having been attained. (emphasis added)"7
In speaking of whether the treaty itself had received sufficiently
widespread and representative participation the Court noted that " ...
the number of ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though
respectable, hardly sufficient."68 The Court went on to say that al-
though there are reasons beyond disapproval that may cause non-rati-
fication of treaties, these reasons " . . . can hardly constitute a basis
on which positive acceptance of its principles can be implied."6 9 Thus
it should be clear that a sufficiently large number of states is required
to cause the Court to imply opinio juris concerning any treaty provi-
sion sufficient to turn it into customary international law.
61. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20).
62. Convention on Political Asylum, Dec. 26, 1933 reprinted in 6 MANLEY 0.
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 607 (1932-34). Treaty on Political Asylum and
Refuge, Aug. 4, 1939 reprinted in 8 MANLEY 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLA-
TION 404 (1938-41).
63. Asylum, supra note 61, at 277.
64. Id.
65. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53.
66. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, reprinted in 52 AM. J. INTL L.
842 (1958).
67. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 41.
68. Id. at 42.
69. Id.
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That a treaty accepted by a minority of states should be given the
ability to create customary international law seems non-sensical. Inter-
estingly, third world objections to customary international law in gen-
eral have noted the creation of law by a small minority of states as one
basis of their objections to the current body of customary international
law." One good example of the minority rule phenomenon, that fol-
lows from the acceptance of the notion that the coming-into-force of a
global treaty creates customary international law, is the above men-
tioned Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.71 The Convention
was completed and open for signature and ratification in 1969. It re-
quired only thirty-five ratifications to come into force.72 In 1969 this
represented only 25% of the existing states of the world. The Conven-
tion did not enter into force until January 27, 1980, eleven years after
its completion. By then, the states that brought the treaty into force
represented only 21% of the world's states. Even more startling is the,
fact that these states accounted for slightly over 25% of the total of the
world's treaties.7" Moreover, only three of the top ten treaty-making
states of the world, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy had ratified
the treaty.7 These three states alone accounted for 30% of all of the
treaties to which the thirty five ratifying states were parties.75
Assuming that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
contained provisions that were new to customary international law at
the time of its ratification and that the ratification of the treaty turned
these rules into customary international law, then 21% of the world's
states, including only three of the top ten treaty making states, can be
said to have created customary international law. This new law would
now be binding on the other 79% of the world's states, a group com-
posed of all but three of the world's major treaty making states whose
members account for nearly 75% of the world's treaties.
At this writing, only seventy-six states are parties to the treaty,
less than half of the world's existing states. The world's leading treaty-
making states - including the United States as a party to 7% of the
world's treaties - are not accounted for among these seventy-six
states.76 The U. S. total is nearly twice that of the next leading state.
It surely is a leap of faith to assert that this treaty, which concerns
itself with treaty law, could have established law for its non-parties
70. J. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law and the Role of
the World Court, 11 MICH. J. INTL L. 129, 156 (1989).
71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N.Doc. A/CONF.39/27, (1969) reprinted in 63 AM. J. INTL'L L. 875 (1969).
72. See Id., at art. 84.
73. ROHN, supra note 59, at 111-17.
74. Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General, Status as at 31
December 1994 at 757, U.N. Doc.ST/LEG/DRT.E/13 (1995).
75. ROHN, supra note 59, at 111-17.
76. ROHN, supra note 59, at 84.
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representing a significant number of the world's states and accounting
for a large portion of all of the world's treaties.
Many of the provisions of this treaty present no particular prob-
lem since, as noted above, they reflect rules and practices that already
existed at the time and were simply incorporated into the treaty. In
other words, they were already accepted as part of customary interna-
tional law governing treaty relations. But, what of those rules that are
not reflective of state practice and which attempt to create new law?
Would any third party state be satisfied with the assertion that 21% of
the world's states are able to create customary international law and
thereby the obligation to obey, especially when these states do not
include most of the world's largest treaty making states?
In addition to a magnitudinal requirement, the Court has suggest-
ed what might be referred to as a qualitative requirement as well,
"... a very widespread and representative participation in the conven-
tion might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose
interests were specially affected."77 (emphasis added) This brings us to
our second condition, the participation of pertinent states.
B. Pertinent States
It has been argued by some authors that law making treaties
cannot successfully create obligations for third parties through the cre-
ation of customary law if the pertinent states are not parties to the
treaty.7" Other authors like D'Amato argue that regardless of the
number of parties and regardless of which parties they are, customary
international law can be generated by a treaty, thereby obligating
third states.79 Political and legal reality, however, would seem to sup-
port the argument in favor of the necessity of pertinent states being
part of the agreement. As suggested by our example of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, it makes little sense to think of
treaties creating customary law for states when those states most
concerned with the particular treaty are not parties to it. We might
call these states sine qua non states (SQN states) for without their
participation in the law, the law would have no realistic meaning. If,
for example, most of the major maritime powers are not party to a
treaty governing the uses of the sea, those treaty- based laws would
not obligate these states and thus would not regulate their behavior. If
treaty provisions are not followed in practice by the non-party SQN
states, then there seems little point in declaring them to be creative of
customary international law obligating all states.80 It remains simply
77. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 42.
78. Schwebel, supra note 40. C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Trea-
ties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INTIL L. 401 (1953).
79. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 165.
80. We are not necessarily arguing here, as does Weisburb, that mere violations
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an idealistic notion.
Many other issues can be found where the identification of SQN
states is rather easy. In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
the SQN states would be the world's major treaty-making states. With-
out the participation of most of the world's largest treaty-makers it can
hardly be said that the treaty can create new provisions of customary
international law relevant to treaty law. Certainly, many of the new
law creating provisions of this treaty may have been accepted in prac-
tice by the major treaty making states, but the treaty itself cannot
provide evidence of this fact. One must rely instead on the traditional
means of determining whether something has become a part of custom-
ary international law, state practice, and opinio juris. Likewise, states
with deep sea bed mining capabilities would have to be regarded as
SQN states for that part of UNCLOS III which sets up the deep sea
bed mining regime.8' The fact that an extra protocol was later added
to UNCLOS III to accommodate these states and bring them into the
treaty in general gives support to the importance of SQN states in this
particular treaty.82
Sometimes the number of SQN states may even be rather small.
In the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects," for example, only states with space launch capabili-
ties would be SQN states. This would be true not only in that section
of the treaty dealing with liability for collisions between space ob-
jects, 4 but also in the section dealing with absolute liability for ob-
jects falling to earth.' By viewing this treaty as having created cus-
of the law constitute evidence that the law does not exist, but rather that wide-
spread acceptance must include the major relevant actors in the issue area. If there
actors ratify a treaty and then violate its provisions, they are, as D'Amato notes,
lawbreakers and not necessarily new law creators. For a cogent debate see Anthony
D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNATL L. 459 (1988). Anthony D'Amato, A Brief Rejoinder, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNATL L. 489 (1988). A.M. Weisburd, A Reply to Professor D'Amato, 21 VAND.
J. TRANSNATL L. 473 (1988).
We should also note that the idea of SGN states is not a "yes or no" issue,
but rather one of degree. Some states, depending upon the issue, may be more im-
portant as participants than others. As one moves down the scale from most obvi-
ously important to least obviously important the judgments will become more dif-
ficult towards the middle of the scale. The importance of the participation of certain
states, however, is not something that one can decide abstractly, but depends on the
specific issue and on the judgment of judges, scholars, and statesmen.
81. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)
[hereinafter UNCLOS Treaty].
82. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex Agenda Item 36, U.N. Doc. A/RES.48/263 (1994).
83. Space Objects Convention, supra note 47.
84. See Space Objects Convention, supra note 47.
85. Space Objects Convention, supra note 47, art. II.
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tomary international law, because of the participation of all launch
capable states, all states are eligible for liability claims for any damage
caused by space objects, regardless of whether they have participated
in the treaty.
The requirement that SQN states be a significant part of the
treaty for the treaty to take effect is not without precedent in inter-
national law.86 The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (hereinafter MARPOL)87 requires that the treaty
will " . . . enter into force twelve months after the date on which not
less than 15 states, the combined merchant fleets of which constitute
not less than fifty percent of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant
shipping, have become parties... "8 By 1990, "... the Convention
had attracted participation by States representing over 85% of gross
merchant tonnage."89 MARPOL is global in scope, being open to all
states for ratification or accession. At the time of this writing ninety-
one States had ratified or acceded to MARPOL. While this represents
fewer than half of the world's states, it represents 85% of the world's
significant shipping states ° and, as noted above, over 85% of the
world's gross merchant tonnage. In this particular instance the treaty
ratifications by SQN states can serve as convincing evidence that its
provisions may also become fixed as customary international law.
An objection might be raised to our position that SQN states need
to be parties to a treaty before it can be regarded as part of customary
law. If all pertinent states are parties to a certain treaty, then what
need is there to assert that its provisions have become part of custom-
ary law, since the treaty itself already obligates all of its parties? If all
states in the international community are parties to a treaty then this
objection might have merit. With the exception of wishing to obligate
states that might later withdraw from the treaty, there would be little
gained by saying that the treaty had become part of customary inter-
national law. The point in asserting that a treaty has become part of
86. The concept of SQN states was an important part of the United Nations
Charter. Article 110(3) requires that, "The present Charter shall come into force
upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, and the United States, and by a majority of the other signatory states." U.N.
CHARTER art. 110, para. 3. See also L. M. GOODRICH AND E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS, 43 (2d ed. 1949).
87. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
at 762-76 (Harold Hohmann ed., 1992).
88. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
89. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A SUR-
VEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 161 (Peter H. Sand ed., 1992).
90. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets of
the World: Oceangoing Steam and Motor Ships of 1,000 Gross Tons and Over as of
January 1, 1987 (1988).
1996
90 DENV. J. INTL L. & POLY VOL. 25:1
customary international law lies in obligating all states. In a univer-
sally accepted treaty, that has already been done by the treaty itself.
But, this is hardly realistic. The United Nations Charter is probably
the closest thing to a universally accepted treaty." Thus, even if all of
the SQN states are parties to a certain treaty, the international com-
munity would probably wish to see the behavior of other states regu-
lated by the treaty provisions. Alternatively, the treaty might be ac-
cepted by only some or most of the SQN states, but they might also
wish to see the treaty provisions become part of customary law in
order to obligate the non-parties.
Returning to the MARPOL treaty, we find that seventeen out of
twenty of the world's largest shipping states have become parties to
the convention. This probably constitutes a sufficient portion of this
treaty's SQN states to assert, on grounds of SQN state participation,
that the treaty provisions are part of customary international law.
Interestingly, the three states of the top twenty non-parties are three
of the world's largest oil producing states.92 Given their potential for
disastrous spills, the remainder of the community of states might wish
the imposition of customary international law, generated by MARPOL,
on these three states despite their non-party status. Even if all of the
top twenty shipping states were parties to MARPOL, sufficient
shipping and subsequent potential for marine pollution exists beyond
the major shipping states. This also gives rise to the desire that the
MARPOL provisions would obligate nonparties through the creation of
customary law.
The test of SQN states as parties to the treaty, then, does not
necessarily require that all SQN states be parties, but that a sufficient
number of them have accepted the treaty to have considered it as hav-
ing formed part of customary international law. "Sufficient number" is
obviously not a precise concept, but as a generic term it cannot be.
When applied to a specific treaty however, it should be easier to decide
how many is sufficient. In some treaties, like UNCLOS III, sufficiency
may require only most (e.g. two-thirds) of the major maritime powers.
In other treaties, like the various outer space treaties, sufficiency may
require all of the launch-capable states. By applying the test of wheth-
er the SQN states are parties to the treaty we have a second piece of
evidence to test whether a treaty or any of its provisions have become
part of customary international law.
91. U.N. CHARTER.
92. U.S. Dept. of State, TREATIES IN FORCE 253-254 (1983). The major oil pro-
ducing states that have not ratified the treaty are Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait.
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C. Reservations
Our third condition for whether treaty provisions directly can
become part of customary international law has been noted by Baxter
and subsequently restated more definitively by the ICJ in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases.93 Referring to the Geneva Gas Protocol of
1925,94 Baxter noted: "The reservations are persuasive evidence that
a number of the parties did not initially regard the Protocol as declara-
tory of a rule of customary international law placing an unqualified
obligation upon all States to refrain from the use of such methods of
warfare."95 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases," the Court
stated that any treaty provision subject to reservations by states can-
not be said to be formative of customary international law.97 In this
case, the Court distinguished between Articles One through Three of
the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention,98 which did not allow
reservations and the remaining articles in the treaty which did. The
article in question in this case was Article Six. The Court noted:
Finally, the faculty of making reservations to Article 6, while it
might not of itself prevent the equidistance principle being eventu-
ally received as general law, does add considerably to the difficulty
of regarding this result as having been brought about (or being
potentially possible) on the basis of the Convention."
In other words, provisions in treaties that allow reservations may
become part of customary international law by other means, but the
treaty itself cannot be taken as creative of customary law. Moreover,
the Court has stated, " ... it must be observed that no valid conclu-
sions can be drawn from the fact that the faculty of entering reserva-
tions ... has been exercised only sparingly and within certain lim-
its.""° Thus, it is not whether states have made reservations that is
93. For a discussion of the Court's methodology for determining when treaty pro-
visions can become a rule of customary law, see D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 109-12.
94. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S.
65.
95. Baxter, supra note 3, at 284.
96. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 42.
97. D'AMATO, supra note 3, at 111. "The Court is basically saying in the Conti-
nental Shelf case that any rule from which a state can unilaterally withdraw does
not rise to the level of being a legal rule of general validity." Id.
98. Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, 400 U.N.T.S. 311.
99. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at 42.
100. Id. at 43. One interesting side note to the issue of treaty provisions becom-
ing part of customary international law relates to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, and in particular, Article 38. We see that the treaty does allow
reservations and that at least one state (Costa Rica) has made a reservation con-
cerning this article. According to the Court's wisdom then, Article 38, which allows
that a rule in a treaty can become binding on third states if it is part of customary
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important, but rather whether the provisions in the treaty are subject
to reservations. The logic behind this finding by the Court should be
clear. Any provision in a treaty that states are allowed to treat as not
applying to themselves should not become a part of customary interna-
tional law where states do not have the option of treating the law as
res inter alios acta.
Of our three conditions, the reservations test is the most stringent
and will no doubt eliminate many global treaties from contention as
being creative of customary international law. For example, all of the
treaties discussed above, with the exception of UNCLOS III, are among
those which allow reservations but which are accepted by many au-
thors as having created customary international law. Perhaps then
this test is too restrictive of the development of customary law through
the convention process. Although it is restrictive, the Court has indi-
cated that the derivation of customary law from treaty law is a result
"not lightly to be regarded as having been attained.""' Perhaps re-
strictiveness is not a major problem then, and for reasons of conflict
avoidance1" and practical application it might best be retained; little,
it seems, would be lost. Treaties are the major source of international
law in the contemporary world. They create legal obligations for their
parties and most often the parties to certain treaties are also the
states most concerned to obey them, the SQN states. To attempt to ex-
tend these treaty obligations to other states through the asserted gen-
eration of customary international law probably makes little difference
in most instances. In those few instances where it seems important for
the international community to see a customary law established that
has been put forth originally in a treaty, (perhaps because a pressing
problem needs international cooperation" s) there is still reason to be
rigorous and realistic when asserting that such a norm does exist.10"
Moreover, treaties of this sort can be created without allowing reserva-
tions, as has been done with UNCLOS III."0' The original logic that
omits treaties allowing reservations from directly becoming part of
customary international law still remains.
international law, must itself not be able to pass into customary international law
solely on the basis of the treaty. Its presence within the corpus of customary inter-
national law must therefore depend upon the usual imprecise methods of determin-
ing if something has become part of customary international law, state practice and
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We argued at the outset that it makes some sense to think that
customary international law imposes obligations on states. We suggest-
ed that a state's participation in the international system is a way of
giving tacit consent to obey the rules of customary international law.
We then turned to the problem of whether treaties, which normally
bind only their parties, can become part of customary international
law, thus binding all states. We have argued that while it is possible
for treaty provisions to form a part of customary international law,
such formation requires something more, in most cases, than simply
the entry into force of the treaty. We devised a three-part test, relying
upon decisions of the Court and writings of various authors. Our test
requires that a sufficient number of states be party to the treaty, that
they include among their numbers those states that are most con-
cerned with the provisions of the specific treaty, and finally that the
provisions of the treaty do not allow reservations. This three-part test,
while likely eliminating most multilateral treaties from contention for
conversion to customary law, nonetheless, seems properly stringent
because conflicts are likely to arise by attempting to apply treaty law
too broadly as customary law."~
Though the notion of treaties becoming part of customary interna-
tional law has gained considerable credibility in the past two decades,
it remains a controversial topic. Because of many pressing global prob-
lems it has often been seen as necessary to create laws rather quickly
that obligate all states in the international system. Treaties are the
quickest way to create law, but they often suffer from lack of universal
acceptance. Given the pacta tertiis principle, one way around this prob-
lem is to argue that the treaty provisions establish customary interna-
tional law obligating all states. Additionally, states that cooperate to
solve global problems with treaties that obligate only themselves, prob-
ably do not wish to be disadvantaged relative to the non-participants.
The stratospheric ozone depletion issue, for example, was one where
cooperating states would have been economically disadvantaged if
states producing significant quantities of chlorofiuorocarbons remained
outside the confines of the treaty and also were not bound by custom-
ary international law to refrain from the production of these ozone
depleting agents. 7
While we are sympathetic to these problems and understand the
proposed solution, we cannot be sanguine about the likely success of
trying to apply this concept without the widespread acceptance of
106. Jenks, supra note 78.
107. Gary L. Scott, Geoffrey Reynolds, & Anthony Lott, Success and Failure Com-
ponents of Global Enuirnomental Cooperation: The Making of International Environ-
mental Law, 2 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 23, 46-58 (1995); Weisburd, supra note 80,
at 476-81.
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states and particularly those states most affected by the new laws. We
think then that the three-part test we have suggested holds out the
most realistic way of judging whether treaty provisions have become
part of customary international law.
